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Abstract. Separation logic has been successful at verifying that pro-
grams do not crash due to illegal use of resources. The underlying as-
sumption, however, is that machines do not fail. In practice, machines
can fail unpredictably for various reasons, e.g. power loss, corrupting
resources. Critical software, e.g. file systems, employ recovery methods to
mitigate these effects. We introduce an extension of the Views framework
to reason about such methods. We use concurrent separation logic as
an instance of the framework to illustrate our reasoning, and explore
programs using write-ahead logging, e.g. an ARIES recovery algorithm.
1 Introduction
There are many ways that software can fail: either software itself can be the
cause of the failure (e.g. memory overflow or null pointer dereferencing); or the
failure can arise independently of the software. These unpredictable failures are
either transient faults, such as when a bit is flipped by cosmic radiation, or host
failures (also referred to as crashes). Host failures can be classified into soft, such
as those arising from power loss which can be fixed by rebooting the host, and
hard, such as permanent hardware failure.
Consider a simple transfer operation that moves money between bank accounts.
Assuming that bank accounts can have overdrafts, the transfer can be regarded
as a sequence of two steps: first, subtract the money from one bank account; and
then add the money to the other account. In the absence of host failures, the
operation should succeed. However, if a host failure occurs in the middle of the
transfer, money is lost. Programmers employ various techniques to recover some
consistency after a crash, such as write-ahead logging (WAL) and associated
revovery code. In this paper, we develop the reasoning to verify programs that
can recover from host failures, assuming hard failures do not happen.
Resource reasoning, as introduced by separation logic [15], is a method for
verifying that programs do not fail. A triple
{
P
}
C
{
Q
}
is given a fault-avoiding,
partial correctness interpretation. This means that, assuming the precondition P
holds then, if program C terminates, it must be the case that C does not fail
and has all the resource necessary to yield a result which satisfies postcondition
Q. Such reasoning guarantees the correct behaviour of the program, ensuring
that the software does not crash itself due to bugs, e.g. invalid memory access.
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However, it assumes that there are no other failures of any form. To reason about
programs that can recover from host failures, we must change the underlying
assumptions of resource reasoning.
We swap the traditional resource models with one that distinguishes between
volatile and durable resource: the volatile resource (e.g. in RAM) does not survive
crashes; whereas the durable resource (e.g. on the hard drive) does. Recovery
operations use the durable state to repair any corruptions caused by the host
failure. We introduce fault-tolerant resource reasoning to reason about programs
in the presence of host failures and their associated recovery operations. We
introduce a new fault-tolerant Hoare triple judgement of the form:
S ` {PV | PD} C {QV | QD}
which has a partial-correctness, resource fault-avoiding and host failing interpre-
tation. From the standard resource fault avoiding interpretation: assuming the
precondition PV | PD holds, where the volatile state satisfies PV and the durable
PD, then if C terminates and there is no host failure, the volatile and durable
resource will satisfy QV and QD respectively. From the host-failing interpretation:
when there is a host failure, the volatile state is lost, and after potential recovery
operations, the remaining durable state will satisfy the fault condition S.
We extend the Views framework [3], which provides a general account of
concurrent resource reasoning, with these fault-tolerant triples to provide a general
framework for fault-tolerant resource reasoning. We instantiate our framework to
give a fault-tolerant extension of concurrent separation logic [11] as an illustrative
example. We use this instantiation to verify the correctness of programs that
make use of recovery protocols to guarantee different levels of fault tolerance. In
particular, we study a simple bank transaction using write-ahead logging and a
simplified ARIES recovery algorithm [8], widely used in database systems.
2 Motivating Examples
We introduce fault-tolerant resource reasoning by showing how a simple bank
transfer can be implemented and verified to be robust against host failures.
2.1 Naive Bank Transfer
Consider a simple transfer operation that moves money between bank accounts.
Using a separation logic [15] triple, we can specify the transfer operation as:
`
{Account(from, v) ∗ Account(to, w)}
transfer(from, to, amount)
{Account(from, v − amount) ∗ Account(to, w + amount)}
The internal structure of the account is abstracted using the abstract predi-
cate [12], Account(x, v), which states that there is an account x with balance
v. The specification says that, with access to the accounts from and to, the
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transfer will not fault. It will decrease the balance of account from by amount
and increase the balance of account to by the same value. We can implement
the transfer operation as follows:
function transfer(from, to, amount) {
widthdraw(from, amount); deposit(to, amount);
}
Using separation logic, it is possible to prove that this implementation satisfies the
specification, assuming no host failures. This implementation gives no guarantees
in the presence of host failures. However, for this example, it is clearly desirable
for the implementation to be aware that host failures occur. In addition, the
implementation should guarantee that in the event of a host failure the operation
is atomic: either it happened as a whole, or nothing happened. Note that the
word atomic is also used in concurrency literature to describe an operation that
takes effect at a single, discrete instant in time. In §3 we combine concurrency
atomicity of concurrent separation logic with host failure atomicity: if an operation
is concurrently atomic then it is also host-failure atomic.
2.2 Fault-tolerant Bank Transfer: Implementation
We want an implementation of transfer to be robust against host failures and
guarantee atomicity. One way to achieve this is to use write-ahead logging (WAL)
combined with a recovery operation. We assume a file-system module which
provides standard atomic operations to create and delete files, test their existence,
and write to and read from files. Since file systems are critical, their operations
have associated internal recovery procedures in the event of a host failure.
Given an arbitrary program C, we use [C] to identify that the program is
associated with a recovery. We can now rewrite the transfer operation, making
use of the file-system operations to implement a stylised WAL protocol as follows:
function transfer(from, to, amount) {
fromAmount := getAmount(from);
toAmount := getAmount(to);
[create(log)] ;
[write(log, (from, to, fromAmount, toAmount))] ;
setAmount(from, fromAmount− amount);
setAmount(to, toAmount + amount);
[delete(log)] ;
}
The operation works by first reading the amounts stored in each account. It then
creates a log file, log, where it stores the amounts for each account. It then
updates each account, and finally deletes the log file. If a host failure occurs the
log provides enough information to implement a recovery operation. In particular,
its absence from the durable state means the transfer either happened or not,
while its presence indicates the operation has not completed. In the latter case,
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we restore the initial balance by reading the log. An example of such a recovery
operation is the following:
function transferRecovery() {
b := [exists(log)] ;
if (b) {
(from, to, fromAmount, toAmount) := [read(log)] ;
if (from 6= nil && to 6= nil) {
setAmount(from, fromAmount); setAmount(to, toAmount);
}
[delete(log)] ;
}
}
The operation tests if the log file exists. If it does not, the recovery completes
immediately since the balance is already consistent. Otherwise, the values of the
accounts are reset to those stored in the log file which correspond to the initial
balance. While the recovery operation is running, a host failure may occur, which
means that upon reboot the recovery operation will run again. Eventually the
recovery operation completes, at which point the transfer either occurred or did
not. This guarantees that transfer is atomic with respect to host failures.
2.3 Fault-tolerant Bank Transfer: Verification
We introduce the following new Hoare triple for specifying programs that run in
a machine where host failures can occur:
S ` {PV | PD} C {QV | QD}
where PV , PD, QV , QD and S are assertions in the style of separation logic and C
is a program. PV and QV describe the volatile resource and PD and QD describe
the durable resource. The judgement is read as a normal Hoare triple when there
are no host failures. The interpretation of the triples is partial resource fault
avoiding and host failing. Given an initial PV | PD, it is safe to execute C without
causing a resource fault. If no host failure occurs, and C terminates, the resulting
state will satisfy QV | QD. If a host failure occurs, then the durable state will
satisfy the fault-condition S.
Given the new judgement we can describe the resulting state after a host
failure. Protocols designed to make programs robust against crashes make use
of the durable resource to return to a consistent state after reboot. We must be
able to describe programs that have a recovery operation running after reboot.
We introduce the following triple:
R ` {PV | PD} [C] {QV | QD}
The notation [C] is used to identify a program with an associated recovery. The
assertion R describes the durable resource after the recovery takes place.
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We can now use the new judgements to verify the write-ahead logging
transfer and its recovery. In their implementation, we use a simplified journaling
file system as the durable resource with the following operations:
emp ∨ file(name, []) ` {emp | emp} [create(name)] {emp | file(name, [])}
emp ∨ file(name, xs) ` {emp | file(name, xs)} [delete(name)] {emp | emp}
emp ` {emp | emp} [exists(name)] {ret = false ∧ emp | emp}
file(name, xs) `
{
emp | file(name, xs)}
[exists(name)]{
ret = true ∧ emp | file(name, xs)}
file(name, xs) ∨ file(name, xs++ [x]) `
{
emp | file(name, xs)}
[write(name, x)]{
emp | file(name, xs++ [x])}
file(name, []) `
{
emp | file(name, [])}
[read(name)]{
ret = nil ∧ emp | file(name, [])}
file(name, [x] ++ xs) `
{
emp | file(name, [x] ++ xs)}
[read(name)]{
ret = x ∧ emp | file(name, [x] ++ xs)}
We specify the write-ahead logging transfer with the following triple:
S `
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
transfer(from, to, amount){
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ emp
Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a)
}
where
S = (Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w))
∨ (Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ file(log, []))
∨ (Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]))
∨ (Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]))
∨ (Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a) ∗ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)])
∨ (Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a))
A proof of that the implementation satisfies the specification is shown in figure 1.
If there is a crash, the current specification of transfer only guarantees that
the durable resource satisfies S. This includes the case where money is lost. This
is undesirable. What we want is a guarantee that the operation is atomic. In
order to add this guarantee, we must combine reasoning about the operation
with reasoning about its recovery to establish that undesirable states are fixed
after recovery. We formalise the combination of an operation and its recovery
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S `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
fromAmount := getAmount(from);
toAmount := getAmount(to);{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w))
}
[create(log)] ;{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ file(log, [])
}
[write(log, (from, to, fromAmount, toAmount))] ;{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)])
}
setAmount(from, fromAmount− amount);{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)])
}
setAmount(to, toAmount + amount);{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a) ∗ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)])
}
[delete(log)] ;{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ emp
Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a)
}
Fig. 1. Proof of transfer operation using write-ahead logging.
in order to provide robustness guarantees against crashes in the following proof
rule:
CR recovers C
S ` {PV | PD} C {QV | QD}
S ` {emp | S} CR {true | R}
R ` {PV | PD} [C] {QV | QD}
When implementing a new operation, we use the recovery abstraction rule to
establish the fault-condition R we wish to expose to the client. In the second
premiss we must first derive what the durable resource S will be immediately
after a host-failure. In the third premiss, we establish that given S, the associated
recovery operation will change the durable resource to the desired R. Note that
because the recovery CR runs immediately after the host failure, the volatile
resource of its precondition is empty. Furthermore, we require the fault-condition
of the recovery to be the same as the resource that is being recovered, since the
recovery operation itself may fail due to a host-failure; i.e. recovery operations
must be able to recover themselves.
We allow recovery abstraction to derive any fault-condition that is established
by the recovery operation. If that fault-condition is a disjunction between the
durable pre- and post-conditions, PD ∨QD, then the operation [C] appears to be
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atomic with respect to host failures. Either the operation’s (durable) resource
updates completely, or not at all. No intermediate states are visible to the client.
In order for transfer to be atomic, according to the recovery abstraction
rule, transferRecovery must satisfy the following specification:
S `
{
emp
S
}
transferRecovery(){
true
(Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)) ∨ (Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a))
}
The proof that the implementation satisfies this specification is given in figure 2.
By applying the abstraction recovery rule we get the following specification for
transfer which guarantees atomicity in case of a crash:
R `
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
[transfer(from, to, amount)]{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ emp
Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a)
}
where
R = (Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)) ∨ (Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a))
With this example, we have seen how to guarantee atomicity by logging the
information required to undo operations. Advanced write-ahead logging protocols
also store information allowing to redo operations and use concurrency control.
We do not go into depth on how to enforce concurrency control in our examples
other than the example shown in §3.1. It follows the common techniques used
in concurrent separation logic.1 However, in §4 we show ARIES, an advanced
algorithm that uses write-ahead logging. A different style of write-ahead logging
is used by file systems called journaling [14], which we discuss in appendix A.
3 Program Logic
Until now, we have only seen how to reason about sequential programs, eliding
the details of reasoning about concurrent programs. We use resource invariants,
in the style of concurrent separation logic [11], that are updated by primitive
atomic operations. Here primitive atomic is used to mean that the operation
takes effect at a single, discrete instant in time. Primitive atomic operations are
atomic with respect to host failures.
The general judgement that enables us to reason about host failing concurrent
programs is:
JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C
{
QV | QD
}
1 For an introduction to concurrent separation logic verification see [18].
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S `{
emp
S
}
b := [exists(log)] ;
b = b ∧ emp
S ∧ (b =⇒ file(log, []) ∗ true ∨ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]) ∗ true)
∧ (¬b =⇒ Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∨ Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a))

if (b) {{
b = b ∧ emp
S ∧ (file(log, []) ∗ true ∨ file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]) ∗ true)
}
(from, to, fromAmount, toAmount) := [read(log)] ;
if (from 6= nil && to 6= nil) {{
b = b ∧ from = f ∧ to = t ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
S ∧ (file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]) ∗ true)
}
setAmount(from, fromAmount); setAmount(to, toAmount);
b = b ∧ from = f ∧ to = t ∧ fromAmount = v ∧ toAmount = w ∧ emp
S ∧ (file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]) ∗ true) ∧
(Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ true)

}
b = b ∧ emp
S ∧ ((file(log, []) ∗ true) ∨ (file(log, [(f, t, v, w)]) ∗ true)) ∧
(Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∗ true)

[delete(log)] ;{
b = b ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
}{
b = b ∧ emp
Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ∨ Account(f, v − a) ∗ Account(t, w + a)
}
Fig. 2. Proof that the transfer recovery operation guarantees atomicity.
Here, PV | PD and QV | QD are pre- and postconditions as usual and describe
the volatile and durable resource. S is a durable assertion, which we refer to
as the fault-condition, describing the durable resource of the program C after a
host failure and possible recovery. The interpretation of these triples is partial
resource fault avoiding and host failing. Starting from an initial state satisfying
the pre-condition PV | PD, it is safe to execute C without causing a resource
fault. If no host failure occurs and C terminates, the resulting state will satisfy
the postcondition QV | QD. The shared resource invariant JV | JD is maintained
throughout the execution of C. If a host failure occurs, all volatile resource is
lost and the durable state will (after possible recoveries) satisfy S ∗ JD.
We give an overview of the key proof rules of Fault-tolerant Concurrent
Separation Logic (FTCSL) in figure 3. Here we do not formally define the syntax
of our assertions, although we describe the semantics in §5. In general, volatile
and durable assertions can be parameterised by any separation algebra.
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sequence
JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C1
{
RV | RD
}
JV | JD ;S `
{
RV | RD
}
C2
{
QV | QD
}
JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C1;C2
{
QV | QD
}
consequence
PV | PD =⇒ P ′V | P ′D Q′V | Q′D =⇒ QV | QD S′ =⇒ S
JV | JD ;S′ `
{
P ′V | P ′D
}
C
{
Q′V | Q′D
}
JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C
{
QV | QD
}
frame
JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C
{
QV | QD
}
JV | JD ;S ∗RD `
{
PV ∗RV | PD ∗RD
}
C
{
QV ∗RV | QD ∗RD
}
atomic
emp | emp ; (PD ∗ JD ∨QD ∗ JD) `
{
PV ∗ JV | PD ∗ JD
}
C
{
QV ∗ JV | QD ∗ JD
}
JV | JD ; (PD ∨QD) `
{
PV | PD
} 〈C〉 {QV | QD}
share
JV ∗RV | JD ∗RD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C
{
QV | QD
}
JV | JD ;S ∗RD `
{
PV ∗RV | PD ∗RD
}
C
{
QV ∗RV | QD ∗RD
}
parallel
JV | JD ;S1 `
{
PV 1 | PD1
}
C1
{
QV 1 | QD1
}
JV | JD ;S2 `
{
PV 2 | PD2
}
C2
{
QV 2 | QD2
}
JV | JD ; (S1 ∗ S2) ∨ (S1 ∗QD2) ∨ (QD1 ∗ S2) `
{
PV 1 ∗ PV 2 | PD1 ∗ PD2
}
C1 || C2{
QV 1 ∗QV 2 | QD1 ∗QD2
}
recovery abstraction
CR recovers C
JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C
{
QV | QD
}
emp | JD ;S `
{
emp | S} CR {true | R}
JV | JD ;R `
{
PV | PD
}
[C]
{
QV | QD
}
Fig. 3. Selected proof rules of FTCSL
The sequence rule allows us to combine two programs in sequence as long
as they have the same fault-condition and resource invariant. Typically, when
the fault-conditions differ, we can weaken them using the consequence rule,
which adds fault-condition weakening to the standard consequence rule of Hoare
logic. The frame rule, as in separation logic, allows us to extend the pre- and
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postconditions with the same unmodified resource RV ∗RD. However, here the
durable part, RD, is also added to the fault-condition.
The atomic rule allows us to use the resource invariant JV | JD using a
primitive atomic operation. Since the operation executes in a single, discrete,
moment in time, we can think of the operation temporarily owning the resources
JV | JD. However, they must be reestablished at the end. This guarantees that
the every primitive atomic operation maintains the resource invariant. Note that
the rule enforces atomicity with respect to host failures. The share rule allows us
to use local resources to extend the shared resource invariant.
The parallel rule, in terms of pre- and post-conditions is as in concurrent
separation logic. However, the fault-condition describes the possible durable
resources that may result from a host failure while running C1 and C2 in parallel.
In particular, a host-failure may occur while both C1 and C2 are running, in
which case the fault-condition is S1 ∗S2, or when either one of C1, C2 has finished,
in which case the fault-condition is S1 ∗QD2 and S2 ∗QD1 respectively.
Finally, the recovery abstraction rule allows us to prove that a recovery
operation CR establishes the fault-condition R we wish to expose to the client.
The first premiss requires operation CR recovering C, i.e. it is executed on reboot
after a crash during execution of C. The second premiss guarantees that in such
case, the durable resources satisfy S and the shared resource invariant satisfies
JD, while the volatile state is lost after a crash. The third premiss, takes the
resource after the reboot and runs the recovery operation in order to establish
R. Note that JD is an invariant, as there can be potentially parallel recovery
operations accessing it using primitive atomic operations. While the recovery
operation CR is running, there can be any number of host failures, which restart
the recovery. This means that the recovery operation must be able to recover
from itself. We allow recovery abstraction to derive any fault-condition that
is established by the recovery operation. If the fault-condition is a disjunction
between the durable pre- and post-conditions, PV ∨QD, then the operation [C]
appears to be atomic with respect to host failures.
3.1 Example: Concurrent Bank Transfer
Consider two threads that both perform a transfer operation from account f to
account t as shown in §2. The parallel rule requires that each operation acts on
disjoint resources where the precondition confers ownership of the resources it
represents. Since both threads act on the same resource, we synchronise the use
of the resource by the transfer operation using the atomic blocks identified by
〈 〉. A possible specification for the program is the following:
emp | emp ; (∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)) `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
〈[transfer(from, to, amount)]〉; ‖ 〈[transfer(from, to, amount2)]〉;{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
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In order to prove that the program satisfies the specification, we first move
the resources that the transfer operation requires to a shared invariant. We
then prove each thread independently by making use of the atomic rule to gain
temporary access to the shared invariant, within the atomic block, and reuse the
specification given in §2.3. A sketch of the proof is shown in figure 4.
emp | emp ; (∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)) `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
sh
ar
e
emp | ∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ; emp `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
emp
}
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
;
p
ar
al
le
l
emp | ∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w) ; emp `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
emp
}
fr
am
e;
at
o
m
ic emp | emp ; (∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)) `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
[transfer(from, to, amount)] ;{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
emp
}
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
emp
}
fr
am
e;
at
o
m
ic emp | emp ; (∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)) `{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
[transfer(from, to, amount2)] ;{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
emp
}
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
emp
}
{
from = f ∧ to = t ∧ amount = a ∧ amount2 = b ∧ emp
∃v, w.Account(f, v) ∗ Account(t, w)
}
Fig. 4. Sketch proof of two concurrent transfers over the same accounts.
We used a proof in the style of of concurrent separation logic. It is possible to
get stronger postconditions, that maintain exact information about the amounts
of each bank account, using complementary approaches such as Owicki-Gries
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or other separation algebras [18]. The sequential examples in this paper can be
adapted to concurrent applications using the same techniques.
4 Case Study: ARIES
In §2 we saw an example of a very simple transaction and its associated recovery
operation employing write-ahead logging. Relational databases support concurrent
execution of complex transactions following the established ACID (Atomicity,
Consistency, Isolation and Durability) set of properties. ARIES (Algorithms for
Recovery and Isolation Exploiting Semantics) [8], is a collection of algorithms
involving, concurrent execution, write-ahead-logging and failure recovery of
transactions, that is widely-used to establish ACID properties.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to verify that the full set of ARIES
algorithms guarantees ACID properties. Instead, we focus on a stylised version of
the recovery algorithm of ARIES proving that: a) it is idempotent with respect
to host failures, b) after recovery, all transactions recorded in the write-ahead
log have either been completed, or were rolled-back.
Transactions update database records stored in durable memory, which for
the purposes of this discussion we assume to be a single file in a file system. To
increase performance, the database file is divided into fixed-size blocks, called
pages, containing multiple records. Thus input/output to the database file, instead
of records, is in terms of pages, which are also typically cached in volatile memory.
A single transaction may update multiple pages. In the event of a host failure,
there may be transactions that have not yet completed, or have completed but
their updated pages have not yet been written back to the database file.
ARIES employs write-ahead logging for page updates performed by transac-
tions. The log is stored on a durable fault-tolerant medium. The recovery uses the
logged information in a sequence of three phases. First, the analysis phase, scans
the log to determine the (volatile) state, of any active transactions (committed
or uncomitted), at the point of host failure. Next, the redo phase, scans the log
and redos each logged page update, unless the associated page in the database
file is already updated. Finally, the undo phase, scans the log and undos each
page update for each uncomitted transaction. To cope with a possible host failure
during the ARIES recovery, each undo action is logged beforehand. Thus, in the
event of a host failure the undo actions will be retried as part of the redo phase.
In figure 5, we define the log and database model and describe the predicates
we use in our specifications and proofs. We refer the reader to appendix C for the
formal definitions. We model the database state, db, as a set of pages, where each
page comprises the page identifier, the log sequence number (defined later) of the
last update performed on the page, and the page data. The log, lg, is structured
as a sequence of log records, ordered by a log sequence number, lsn ∈ N, each
of which records a particular action performed by a transaction. The ordering
follows the order in which transaction actions are performed on the database.
The logged action, U [tid, pid, op], records that the transaction with identifier tid,
performs the update op : Data→ Data on the page with identified by pid. We
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use op−1 to denote the operation undoing the update op. B[tid], records the start
of a new transaction with identifier tid, and C[tid], records that the transaction
with id tid is committed. The information from the above actions is used to
construct two auxiliary structures used by the recovery to determine the state of
transactions and pages at the point of a host failure. The transaction table (TT),
records the status of all active transactions (e.g. updating, committed) and the
latest log sequence number associated with the transaction. The dirty page table
(DPT), records which pages are modified but yet unwritten to the database and
the first log sequence number of the action that caused the first modification to
a page. To avoid the cost of scanning the entire log, implementations regularly
log snapshots of the TT and DPT in checkpoints, CHK[tt, dpt]. For simplicity,
we assume the log contains exactly one checkpoint.
Let lsn, tid, pid ∈ N, where we use lsn for log sequence numbers, tid for transaction
identifiers, pid for page identifiers, d for page data and op for page-update operations.
Let ∅ be an empty list.
Model:
Database state db ⊆ N× N×Data, triples of pid, lsn, d
Logged actions act ::= U [tid, pid, op] | B[tid] | C[tid] | CHK[tt, dpt]
Log state lg ::= ∅ | (lsn, act) | lg ⊗ lg
Transaction table tt ⊆ N× N× {C,U} , triples of lsn, pid and transaction status
Dirty page table dpt ⊆ N× N, tuples of pid, lsn
Predicates:
log (lg) the state of the log is given by lg (abstract predicate)
db state (db) the state of the database is given by db (abstract predicate)
set (x, s) the set s identified by program variable x (abstract predicate)
log tt (lg, tt) log lg produces the TT entries in tt
log dpt (lg, dpt) log lg produces the DPT entries in dpt
log rl (lg, dpt, ops) given log lg and DPT dpt the list of redo updates is ops
ul undo (lg, tt, ops) given log lg and TT tt the list of undo updates is ops
log undos (ops, lg) given list of undos ops the additional log records are lg
db acts (db, ops, db′) given the list of updates ops, the database db is updated to db′
recovery log (lg, lg′) given log lg log records added by recovery are lg′
recovery db (db, lg, db) given database db and log lg the recovered database state is db′
Axioms:
log
(
lg ⊗ lg′) ⇐⇒ log bseg (lg)⊗ log fseg (lg′)
Fig. 5. Abstract model of the database and ARIES log, and predicates.
The high level overview of the recovery algorithm in terms of its analysis, redo
and undo phases is given in figure 6. The analysis phase first finds the checkpoint
and restores the TT and DPT. Then, it proceeds to scan the log forwards from
the checkpoint, updating the TT and DPT. Any new transaction is added to the
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function aries recovery() {
//ANALYSIS PHASE: restore dirty page table, transcation table
//and undo list at point of host failure.
tt, dpt := aries analyse();
//REDO PHASE: repeat actions to restore database state at host failure.
aries redo(dpt);
//UNDO PHASE: Undo actions of uncommitted transactions.
aries undo(tt);
}
Fig. 6. ARIES recovery: high level structure.
TT. For any commit log record we update the TT to record that the transaction
is committed. For any update log record, we add an entry for the associated page
to the DPT, also recording the log sequence number, unless an entry for the same
page is already in it. We give the following specification for the analysis phase:
log (lgi ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc ) `{
emp
log (lgi ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )
}
tt, dpt := aries analyse(){∃tt′, dpt′. log tt (lgc, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lgc, dpt′) ∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log (lgi ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )
}
The specification states that given the database log, the TT and DPT in the
log’s checkpoint are restored and updated according to the log records following
the checkpoint. The analysis does not modify any durable state.
The redo phase, follows analysis and repeats the logged updates. Specifically,
redo scans the log forward from the record with the lowest sequence number
in the DPT. This is the very first update that is logged, but (potentially) not
yet written to the database. The updates are redone unless the recorded page
associated with that update is not present in the DPT, or a more recent update
has modified it. We give the following specification to redo:
∃ops, ops′, ops′′. (ops = ops′ ⊗ ops′′) ∧ db acts (db, ops′, db′′)
∧ log fseg ((lsn, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (db′′) `{
set (dpt, dpt) ∧ lsn = min(dpt↓2)
log fseg ((lsn, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (db)
}
aries redo(dpt)
set (dpt, dpt) ∧ lsn = min(dpt↓2)
log fseg ((lsn, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (db′) ∧ db acts (db, ops, db′)
∧ log rl ((lsn, act)⊗ lg, dpt, ops)

The specification states that the database is updated according to the logged
update records following the smallest log sequence number in the DPT. The
fault-condition specifies that after a host failure, all, some or none of the redos
have happened. Since redo does not log anything, the log is not affected.
The last phase is undo, which reverts the updates of any transaction that is
not committed. In particular, undo scans the log backwards from the log record
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with the largest log sequence number in the TT. This is the log sequence number
of the very last update. For each update record scanned, if the transaction exists
in the TT and is not marked as committed, the update is reversed. However,
each reverting update is logged beforehand. This ensures, that undos will happen
even in case of host failure, since they will be re-done in the redo phase of the
subsequent recovery run. We give the following specification for the undo phase:
∃lg′, lg′′, lg′′′, ops, ops′, ops′′. lg′ = lg′′ ⊗ lg′′′ ∧ ops = ops′ ⊗ ops′′
∧ db acts (db, ops′, db′′) ∧ log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lg′′) ∗ db state (db′′) `{
set (tt, tt) ∧ lsn = max(tt↓2)
log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)) ∗ db state (db)
}
aries undo(tt){
set (tt, tt) ∧ lsn = max(tt↓2) ∧ ul undo (tt, lg ⊗ (lsn, act), ops)
log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lg′) ∧ log undos (ops, lg′) ∗ db state (db′) ∧ db acts (db, ops, db′)
}
The specification states that the database is updated with actions reverting
previous updates as obtained from the log. These undo actions are themselves
logged. In the event of a host failure the fault-condition specifies that all, some,
or none of the operations are undone and logged.
Using the specification for each phase and using our logic we can derive the
following specification for this ARIES recovery algorithm:
∃lg′, lg′′, db′. log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (db) `{
emp
log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (db)
}
aries recovery()
true
log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′ ⊗ lg′′)
∧ recovery log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′, lg′′)
∗ db state (db′) ∧ recovery db (db, lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′, db′)

The proof that the high level structure of the ARIES algorithm satisfies this
specification is given in figure 7. Implementations of each phase and proofs they
meet their specifications are given in appendix C. The key property of the ARIES
recovery specification is that the durable precondition is the same as the fault-
condition. This guarantees that the recovery is idempotent with respect to host
failures. This is crucial for any recovery operation, as witnessed in the recovery
abstraction rule, guaranteeing that the recovery itself is robust against crashes.
Furthermore, the specification states that any transaction logged as committed
at the time of host failure, is committed after recovery. Otherwise transactions
are rolled back.
5 Semantics and Soundness
We give a brief overview of the semantics of our reasoning and the intuitions
behind its soundness. A detailed account is given in appendix D.
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∃lg′, lg′, db, rl′. log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (db) `{
emp | log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (db)}
se
q
u
en
ce
fr
am
e
//ANALYSIS PHASE
log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) `{
emp | log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′)}
tt, dpt := aries analyse();
∃tt′, dpt′. log tt (lg′, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt, dpt′)
∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log (lg ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′)

∃tt′, dpt′. log tt (lg′, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt, dpt′)
∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log (lg ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (db)

//REDO PHASE: repeat actions to restore database state at host failure.
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
∃lgi, lgc, lg, lg′, db, db′, db′′, lsn≤, act, ops′, ops′′. (ops = ops′ ⊗ ops′′) ∧
log bseg (lgi) ∗ log fseg ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc) ∗ db state (db′′) ∧ db acts (db, ops′, db′′) `
∃tt′, dpt′. lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′ = lgi ⊗ (lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc
∧ lsn≤ = min((dpt unionmulti dpt′)↓2) ∧ log tt (lg′, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt, dpt′)
∧ log ul (lg′, ul) ∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log bseg (lgi) ∗ log fseg ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc) ∗ db state (db)

fr
am
e
∃db′′, ops′, ops′′. (ops = ops′ ⊗ ops′′)
∧ log fseg ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (db′′) ∧ db acts (db, ops′, db′′) `{
set (dpt, dptu) ∧ lsn≤ = min((dptu)↓2)
log fseg ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc) ∗ db state (db)
}
aries redo(dpt);
set (dpt, dptu) ∧ lsn≤ = min((dptu)↓2)
log fseg ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc) ∗ db state (db′)
∧ db acts (db, ops, db′) ∧ log rl ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc, dptu, ops)

lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′ = lgi ⊗ (lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc
∧ lsn≤ = min((dpt unionmulti dpt′)↓2) ∧ log tt (lg′, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt, dpt′)
∧ log ul (lg′, ul) ∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′) ∗ ulist (ul, ul)
log bseg (lgi) ∗ log fseg ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc)
∗ db state (db′) ∧ log rl ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc, dptu, ops)

∃lgc, lsn≤. lg′ = −⊗ (lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc ∧ lsn≤ = min((dpt unionmulti dpt′)↓2)
∧ log tt (lg′, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt, dpt′) ∧ log ul (lg′, ul)
∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (db′)
∧ db acts (db, ops, db′) ∧ log rl ((lsn≤, act)⊗ lgc, dpt unionmulti dpt′, rl′)

co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
,f
ra
m
e //UNDO PHASE: Undo actions of uncommitted transactions.
∃lg′, lg′′, lg′′′, ops, ops′, ops′′. lg′ = lg′′ ⊗ lg′′′ ∧ ops = ops′ ⊗ ops′′
∧ db acts (dbr, ops′, db′′r ) ∧ log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lg′′) ∗ db state (db′′r ) `{
set (tt, tt) ∧ lsn≥ = max(tt↓2) | log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)) ∗ db state (dbr)
}
aries undo(tt, dpt, ul);
set (tt, tt) ∧ lsn = max(tt↓2) ∧ ul undo (tt, lg ⊗ (lsn, act), ops)
log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lg′) ∧ log undos (ops, lg′)
∗ db state (db′r) ∧ db acts (dbr, ops, db′r)

true
log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′ ⊗ lg′′)
∧ recovery log (lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′, lg′′)
∗ db state (db′) ∧ recovery db (db, lg ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lg′, db′)

Fig. 7. Proof of the high level structure of ARIES recovery.
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5.1 Fault-tolerant Views
We define a general fault-tolerant reasoning framework using Hoare triples with
fault-conditions in the style of the Views framework [3]. Pre- and postcondition
assertions are modelled as pairs of volatile and durable views (commutative
monoids). Fault-condition assertions are modelled as durable views 2. Volatile and
durable views provide partial knowledge reified to concrete volatile and durable
program states respectively. Concrete volatile states include the distinguished
host-failed state
 
. The semantic interpretation of a primitive operation is given
as a state transformer function from concrete states to sets of concrete states.
To prove soundness, we encode our Fault-tolerant Views (FTV) framework
into Views [3]. A judgement3 s ` {(pv, pd)} C {(qv, qd)}, where s, pd, qd are
durable views and pv, qv are volatile views is encoded as the Views judgement:{
(pv, qd)
}
C
{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
where volatile views are extended to include
 
and ∨ is disjunction of views. For
the general abstraction recovery rule we encode [C] as a program which can test
for host failures, beginning with C and followed by as many iterations of the
recovery CR as required in case of a host failure.
We require the following properties for a sound instance of the framework:
Host failure: For each primitive operation, its interpretation function must
transform non host-failed states to states including a host-failed state. This
guarantees that each operation can be abruptly interrupted by a host failure.
Host failure propagation: For each primitive operation, its interpretation
function must leave all host-failed states intact. That is, when the state says
there is a host failure, it stays a host failure.
Axiom soundness: The axiom soundness property (property [G] of Views [3]).
The first two are required to justify the general FTV rules, while the final
property establishes soundness of the Views encoding itself. When all the param-
eters are instantiated and the above properties established then the instantiation
of the framework is sound.
5.2 Fault-tolerant Concurrent Separation Logic
We justify the soundness of FTCSL by an encoding into the Fault-tolerant Views
framework discussed earlier. The encoding is similar to the concurrent separation
logic encoding into Views. We instantiate volatile and durable views as pairs of
local views and shared invariants.
The FTCSL judgement (jv, jd) ; s `
{
(pv, pd)
}
C
{
(qv, qd)
}
is encoded as:
s ` {((pv, jv), (pd, jd))} C {((qv, jv), (qd, jd))}
2 We use “Views” to refer to the Views framework of Dinsdale-Young et al. [3], and
“views” to refer to the monoid structures used within it.
3 Note that judgements, such as those in figure 3, using assertions (capital P,Q, S)
are equivalent to judgements using views (models of assertions, little p, q, s).
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The proof rules in figure 3 are justified by soundness of the encoding and simple
application of FTV proof rules. Soundness of the encoding is established by
proving the properties stated in §5.1.
Theorem 1 (FTCSL Soundness).
If the judgement JV | JD ;S `
{
PV | PD
}
C
{
QV | QD
}
is derivable in the
program logic, then if we run the program C from state satisfying PV ∗JV | PD∗JD,
then C will either not terminate, or terminate in state satisfying QV ∗JV | QD∗JD,
or a host failure will occur destroying any volatile state and the remaining durable
state (after potential recoveries) will satisfy S∗JD. The resource invariant JV | JD
holds throughout the execution of C.
6 Related Work
There has been a significant amount of work in critical systems, such as file
systems and databases, to develop defensive methods against the types of failures
covered in this paper [14,19,1,8]. The verification of these techniques has mainly
been through testing [13,6] and model checking [21]. However, these techniques
have been based on building models that are specific to the particular application
and recovery strategy, and are difficult to reuse.
Program logics based on separation logic have been successful in reasoning
about file systems [5,9] and concurrent indexes [16] on which database and file
systems depend. However, as is typical with Hoare logics, their specifications avoid
host failures, assuming that if a precondition holds then associated operations
will not fail. Faulty Logic [7] by Meola and Walker is an exception. Faulty logic
is designed to reason about transient faults, such as random bit flips due to
background radiation, which are different in nature from host failure.
Zengin and Vafeiadis propose a purely functional programming language
with an operational semantics providing tolerance against processor failures in
parallel programs [22]. Computations are check-pointed to durable storage before
execution and, upon detection of a failure, the failed computations are restarted.
In general, this approach does not work for concurrent imperative programs
which mutate the durable store.
In independent work, Chen et al. introduced Crash Hoare Logic (CHL) to
reason about host failures and applied it to a substantial sequential journaling
file system (FSCQ) written in Coq [2]. CHL extends Hoare triples with fault
conditions and provides highly automated reasoning about host failures. FSCQ
performs physical journaling, meaning it uses a write-ahead log for both data
and metadata, so that the recovery can guarantee atomicity with respect to host
failures. The authors use CHL to prove that this property is indeed true. The
resource stored in the disk is treated as durable. Since FSCQ is implemented
in the functional language of Coq, which lacks the traditional process heap, the
volatile state is stored in immutable variables.
The aim of FSCQ and CHL is to provide a verified implementation of a se-
quential file system which tolerates host failures. In contrast, our aim is to provide
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a general methodology for fault-tolerant resource reasoning about concurrent
programs. We extend the Views framework [3] to provide a general concurrent
framework for reasoning about host failure and recovery. Like CHL, we extend
Hoare triples with fault conditions. We instantiate our framework to concurrent
separation logic with host failures, and demonstrate that the ARIES recovery
uses the write-ahead log correctly to guarantee the atomicity of transactions.
In the technical report [10], we explore the differences in the specifications of
fault-tolerance guarantees in physical and logical journaling file systems.
As we are defining a framework, our reasoning of the durable and volatile state
(given by arbitrary view monoids) is general. In contrast, CHL reasoning is specific
to the durable state on the disk and the volatile state in the immutable variable
store. CHL is able to reason modularly about different layers of abstraction of a
file-system implementation, using logical address spaces which give a systematic
pattern of use for standard predicates. We do not explore modular reasoning about
layers of abstractions in this paper. We believe reasoning about abstraction is
orthogonal to reasoning about host failures. Modular reasoning about abstraction
has been widely studied in the separation logic literature [12,4,17,20,18].
We can certainly benefit from the practical CHL approach to mechanisation
and proof automation. We also believe that future work on CHL, especially on
extending the reasoning to heap-manipulating concurrent programs, can benefit
from our general approach.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have developed fault-tolerant resource reasoning, extending the Views frame-
work [3] to reason about programs in the presence of host failures. We have proved
a general soundness result. For this paper, we have focused on fault-tolerant
concurrent separation logic, a particular instance of the framework. We have
demonstrated our reasoning by studying a stylised ARIES recovery algorithm,
showing that it is idempotent and that it guarantees atomicity of database
transactions in the event of a host failure.
There has been recent work on concurrent program logics with the ability to
reason about abstract atomicity [17]. This involves proving that even though the
implementation of an operation takes multiple steps, from the client’s point of
view they can be seen as a single step. Currently, this is enforced by syntactic
primitive atomic blocks (〈 〉) in the programming language. In future, we want
to combine abstract atomicity from concurrency with host failure atomicity.
Another direction for future work involves extending existing specifications
for file systems [5,9] with our framework. This will allow both the verification of
interesting clients programs, such as fault-tolerant software installers or persisted
message queues, and the verification of fault-tolerant databases and file systems.
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A Journaling File Systems
We could have limited recovery abstraction to just this atomic case. However, this
is not the general case for fault tolerance guarantees. Journaling file systems [14]
are a prime example. Such file systems employ write ahead logging techniques so
that file system consistency may be recovered if an operation is interrupted by
a host failure. For example, consider the operation of appending data to a file,
and its specification as given [9], where we simplify slightly by removing the size
argument and assuming the file is opened with O APPEND.{
filedes (fd, ι) ∗ buffer (buf, γ) | file (ι, β)}
write(fd, buf){
filedes (fd, ι) ∗ buffer (buf, γ) | file (ι, β ⊗ γ)}
The specification says that we extend the file with inode ι, associated with the
file descriptor fd, with the contents of the supplied memory buffer γ. For the
purposes of this discussion we distinguish between durable (the file contents) and
volatile (file descriptor and memory buffer) resources.
The implementation of this operation typically involves: i) updating the
inode’s metadata with the new file size, ii) allocating new space, and iii) writing
the append contents. Journaling file systems make different choices regarding
how much information to log and consequently the fault tolerance guarantees.
One choice is to do log all steps, referred to as physical journaling, in which case
the operation is atomic with respect to host failures and we can extended its
specification to the following:
file (ι, β) ∨ file (ι, β ⊗ γ) `
{
filedes (fd, ι) ∗ buffer (buf, γ) | file (ι, β)}
[write(fd, buf)]{
filedes (fd, ι) ∗ buffer (buf, γ) | file (ι, β ⊗ γ)}
However, physical journaling has a significant performance overhead since every
update must be committed twice. Alternatively, file system perform logical
journaling, where only metadata changes are logged. In our example, this means
the third step is not logged. The specification in this case is the following:
file (ι, β ⊗ δ)
∨ ∃δ. sizeof (γ) = sizeof (δ) ∧ file (ι, β ⊗ δ) `{
filedes (fd, ι) ∗ buffer (buf, γ) | file (ι, β)}
[write(fd, buf)]{
filedes (fd, ι) ∗ buffer (buf, γ) | file (ι, β ⊗ γ)}
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As the first and second steps are logged, in the fault-condition we know that
file may be extended to the correct size, but if it is, the new data is effectively
garbage. If we restricted recovery abstraction to the atomic case, we would no be
able to derive useful specifications for such strategies.
B Unsound Rules
We have explored including a rule for deriving a FTCSL specification from a
normal CSL triple. This give raise to two questions: how do we distinguish volatile
and durable resource, and what will the added fault-condition be? Consider the
following candidate rule: {
PV ∗ PD
}
α
{
QV ∗QD
}
PD ∨QD `
{
PV |PD
}
[α]
{
QV |QD
}
where we assume that α is a primitive operation (the premiss is an axiom). Such
a rule would be useful to very easily import existing specifications, e.g. those
given with separation logics for file systems [5,9], into FTCSL.
There two issues. First, even though the fault-condition is the only sensible
one, it is overly restrictive for the same reasons discussed previously on file
appends in journaling file systems. Second, the choice of what ∗-junct to assign
to durable resource seems arbitrary. The solution is to require the CSL of the
premiss to logically distinguish between volatile and durable resources, yet this
introduces extra requirements typically not being met. Even though such a rule
would be sound, we do not include it in FTCSL for the aforementioned reasons.
Assume a CSL which does distinguish between volatile and durable resource,
and consider the following tempting, albeit unsound, rule:{
PV | emp
}
C
{
QV | emp
}
emp ` {PV | emp} C {QV | emp}
The intuition of this rule is that if we know a program does not use durable
resources, then we can infer its fault-condition to be empty. However, the fact that
the pre- and post-condition durable resource is empty does not mean the program
uses no durable resource at all. For example, C can allocate and subsequently
deallocate something durable, in which case the fault-condition should reflect
this. This is an instance of the ABA problem. The bottom line is that an empty
fault-condition does not generally mean durable resource is not used.
C ARIES
In §4 we specified a stylised implementation of the ARIES recovery algorithm.
We also specified the individual phases of the algorithm and presented a high
level proof that the algorithm meets our specification in figure 7. We now proceed
to formally define the predicates used in §4, and prove that each individual phase
satisfies its specification.
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Predicate definitions We give the following definitions for the concrete predi-
cates of figure 5:
log tt (lg, tt) ,
(lg = ∅ ∧ tt = ∅)
∨

∃lsn, act, a, tid, lg′, tt′. (lg = (lsn, act)⊗ lg′)
∧
( ((act = U [tid,−] ∧ a = U) ∨ (act = C[tid] ∧ a = C))∧ tt = (tid, lsn, a)⊕ tt′
)
∨ ((act = CHK[−] ∨ act = R[−]) ∧ tt′ = tt)

∧ log tt (lg′, tt′)

log dpt (lg, dpt) ,
(lg = ∅ ∧ dpt = ∅)
∨
 ∃lsn, pid, lg′, dpt′. (lg = (lsn, U [−, pid])⊗ lg′)∧ ( (pid 6∈ dpt↓1 ∧ dpt = {(pid, lsn)} ∪ dpt ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt′))∨ (pid ∈ dpt↓1 ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt))
)
∨
(∃act, lg′. (lg = (−, act)⊗ lg′) ∧ log dpt (lg′, dpt)
∧ (act = CHK[−] ∨ act = C[−] ∨ act = R[−])
)
log rl (lg, dpt, rl) ,
(lg = ∅ ∧ rl = ∅)
∨

∃lsn, lsn′, tid, pid, lg′, rl′. (lg = (lsn, U [tid, pid])⊗ lg′)
∧
(
(pid, lsn′) ∈ dpt ∧ lsn ≥ lsn′ ∧ (rl = U [tid, pid]⊗ rl′)
∧ log rl (lg′, dpt, rl′)
)
∨ ( (pid) 6∈ dpt↓1 ∧ log rl (lg′, dpt, rl) )

∨
(∃act, lg′. (act = CHK[−] ∨ act = C[−] ∨ act = R[−])
∧ (lg = (−, act)⊗ lg′) ∧ log rl (lg′, dpt, rl)
)
ul undo (lg, tt, ul) ,
(lg = ∅ ∧ ul = ∅)
∨
 ∃lg′, lsn, tid, pid. (lg = lg′ ⊗ (lsn, U [tid, pid]))∧ (( (tid,−, U) ∈ tt ∧ (ul = R[tid, pid]⊗ ul′) ∧ ul undo (lg′, tt, ul′) )∨ ((tid,−, U) 6∈ tt ∧ ul undo (lg′, tt, ul))
)
∨
(∃lg′, act. (act = CHK[−] ∨ act = C[−] ∨ act = R[−])
∧ (lg = lg′ ⊗ (−, act)) ∧ ul undo (lg′, tt, ul)
)
log undos (ul, lg) ,
(ul = ∅ ∧ rl = ∅)
∨
( ∃lsn, tid, pid, ul′, lg′. ul = R[tid, pid]⊗ ul′
∧ lg = (lsn, U [tid, pid])⊗ lg′ ∧ log undos (ul′, lg′)
)
recovery log (lg, lg′) ,
∃lg′′, lsn, act, tt, tt′, tt′′, dpt, dpt′, dpt′′.
log undos (ul, lg′) ∧ ul undo (lg′′ ⊗ (lsn, act), ul)
∧ (lg = lg′′ ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗−) ∧ lsn = max(tt ↓2)
∧ (tt = tt′ ⊕ tt′′) ∧ (dpt = dpt′ unionmulti dpt′′)
∧ (lg = −⊗ (−, CHK[tt′, dpt′])⊗ lgc)
∧ log tt (lgc, tt′′) ∧ log dpt (lgc, dpt′′)
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recovery db (lg, rl) ,
∃rl′, ul, lsn≤, act≤, lsn≥, act≥, dpt′, dpt′′, tt′, tt′′, lgc, lgb, lg′.
rl = rl′ ⊗ ul ∧ log rl ((lsn≤, act≤)⊗ lg′, dpt, rl′)
∧ lsn≤ = min(dpt ↓2) ∧ (lg = −⊗ (lsn≤, act)⊗ lg′)
∧ dpt = dpt′ unionmulti dpt′′ ∧ tt = tt′ ⊕ tt′′
∧ (lg = −⊗ (−, CHK[tt′, dpt′])⊗ lgc) ∧ log dpt (lgc, dpt′′)
∧ log tt (lgc, tt′′) ∧ ul undo (tt, lgb ⊗ (lsn≥, act≥), ul)
∧ (lg = lgb ⊗ (lsn≥, act≥)⊗−) ∧ lsn≥ = max(tt ↓2)
Phase implementations and proofs The implementation of the analysis
phase together with the proof that it meets the specification given in §4 is given
in figure 8. The implementation and proof of the redo phase is given in figure 9.
In figure 10 we give the implementation of the undo phase together with the
proof it meets the specification we have given in §4.
D General Framework and Soundness
We construct a general reasoning framework about host failures on top of the
Views framework [3]. The framework encodes program logic judgements with
fault-conditions, s ` {p} C {q} into judgements of the Views program logic.
Then, soundness of the framework depends on soundness of the encoded logic
and properties required by the encoding itself.
The framework’s construction follows the same structure as that of Views,
even sharing exactly the same parameters in some cases. We will be explicit as
to with which parameters we instantiate the underlying Views framework.
Parameter 1 (Atomic Commands) A set of (syntactic) atomic commands
Atom, ranged over by a.
This is directly passed into Views as the same parameter (parameter A).
Here, the word “atomic” is used in the sense of “primitive”. These commands
inhibit a primitive programming language, which includes parallel composition,
C||C′, non-deterministic choice, C+ C′, and iteration, C∗, and sequential com-
position C;C′. Traditional control flow structures of imperative programming
languages, such as if− then− else and while loops, can be encoded into this
basic language by combining the primitives with extra atomic commands.
Parameter 2 (Volatile Machine States) Assume a set of volatile machine
states, Volatile, ranged over by v. There is an exceptional host-failed state, ∈ Volatile, which represents the effect of a host failure on the volatile state.
Parameter 3 (Durable Machine States) Assume a set of durable machine
states, Durable, ranged over by d.
Definition 1 (Machine States). The set of machine states, S, ranged over by
s, is defined as:
S = Volatile×Durable
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log (lgi ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc ) `{
emp | log (lgi ⊗ (lsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )
}
chkLsn, tt, dpt := init from log();{
set (tt, tt) ∗ set (dpt, dpt)
log (lgi ⊗ (chkLsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )
}
i := log mk f iter(chkLsn);{
log out chk (lgi) ∧ set (tt, tt) ∗ set (dpt, dpt) ∗ fiter (i, lgc)
log (lgi ⊗ (chkLsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )
}
lsn, act := log f next(i);
∃lgp, lgu, lgr, tt′, dpt′. log out chk (lgi)
∧
((
lsn 6= nil ∧ (lgc = lgp ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lgr) ∧ lgu = lgp
)
∨ (lsn = nil ∧ lgr = ∅ ∧ lgu = lgc)
)
∧ log tt (lgu, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lgu, dpt unionmulti dpt′) ∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
∗ fiter (i, lgr)
log (lgi ⊗ (chkLsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )

while (lsn 6= nil) {
∃lgp, lgr, tt′, dpt′. log tt (lgp, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lgp, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′) ∗ fiter (i, lgr)
log (lgi ⊗ (chkLsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgp ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lgr)

at := action get type(act);
tid := action get tid(act);
if (at = U) {
pid := action get pid(act);
tt insert(tt, tid, (lsn, U));
pid′, := dpt search(dpt, pid);
if (pid′ 6= nil) {
dpt insert(dpt, pid, lsn);
}
} else if (at = C) {
tt update(tt, tid, (lsn, C));
}
lsn, act := log f next(i);
}
∃tt′, dpt′. log tt (lgc, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lgc, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′) ∗ fiter (i,∅)
log (lgi ⊗ (chkLsn, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )

log close f iter(i);
return tt, dtp, ut;{∃tt′, dpt′. log tt (lgc, tt′) ∧ log dpt (lgc, dpt′) ∧ set (tt, tt⊕ tt′) ∗ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log (lgi ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗ lgc )
}
Fig. 8. Implementation and proof of the ARIES analysis phase.
This is passed into Views as the “machine states” parameter (parameter B).
Parameter 4 (Interpretation of Atomic Commands) Assume a function
[[−]] : Atom → S → P(S) that associates each atomic command with a non-
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∃rl′, rl′′, rl′′′. (rl′ = rl′′ ⊗ rl′′′) ∧ log fseg ((lsn, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ rl′′) `{
set (dpt, dpt) ∧ lsn = min(dpt↓2)
log fseg ((lsn, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (rl)
}
lsn := dpt get least lsn(dpt);
∃dpt′. log dpt (lgc, dpt, dpt′) ∧ lsn = min((dpt unionmulti dpt′)↓2)
∧ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
emp

∃lgm. log dpt (lgc, dpt, dpt′)
∧ lsn = min((dpt unionmulti dpt′)↓2) ∧ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′)
log (lgi ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗−⊗ (lsn,−)⊗ lgm)

i := log mk f iter(lsn);
lsn, act := log f next(i);
∃tt′, dpt′, lsn≤, lgm, lgp, lgu. log dpt (lgc, dpt, dpt′)
∧
((
lsn 6= nil ∧ (lgm = lgp ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lgr) ∧ lgu = lgp
)
∨ (lsn = nil ∧ lgr = ∅ ∧ lgu = lgm)
)
∧ log rl (lgu, dpt unionmulti dpt′, rl′) ∧ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′) ∗ fiter (i, lgr)
log (lgi ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗−⊗ (lsn≤,−)⊗ lgm) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ rl′)

while (lsn 6= nil) {
at := action get type(act);
if (at = U) {
tid := action get tid(act);
pid := action get pid(act);
pid′, lsn′ := dpt search(dpt, pid);
if (pid′ 6= nil ∧ lsn ≥ lsn′) {
db update(U[tid, pid]);
}
}
lsn, act := log f next(i);
}
∃tt′, dpt′, lsn≤, lgm. log dpt (lgc, dpt, dpt′)
∧ log rl (lgm, dpt unionmulti dpt′, rl) ∧ set (dpt, dpt unionmulti dpt′) ∗ fiter (i,∅)
log (lgi ⊗ (−, CHK[tt, dpt])⊗−⊗ (lsn≤,−)⊗ lgm) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ rl′)

log close f iter(i);{
set (dpt, dpt) ∧ lsn = min(dpt↓2)
log fseg ((lsn, act)⊗ lg) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ rl′) ∧ log rl ((lsn, act)⊗ lg, dpt, rl′)
}
Fig. 9. Implementation and proof of the ARIES redo phase.
determistic state transformer. (Where necessary, we lift non-deterministic state
transformers to sets of states.)
This is directly passed into Views as the same parameter (parameter C).
The following two properties, are properties of our host failure reasoning
framework and not of Views. They are essential to prove soundness of the logic’s
inference rules based on the rules of the Views program logic.
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∃lg′, lg′′, lg′′′, rl′, ul′, ul′′. lg′ = lg′′ ⊗ lg′′′ ∧ ul = ul′ ⊗ ul′′
∧ log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lg′′) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ ul′) `{
set (tt, tt) ∧ lsn = max(tt↓2)
log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)) ∗ db state (rl)
}
ul := ul new();
lsn := tt get max lsn(tt);
i := log mk b iter(lsn);
lsn, act := log b next(i);
tid := action get tid(act);
tid, , st := tt search(tt, tid);
while (lsn 6= nil ∧ tid 6= nil) {
at := action get type(act);
if (at = U ∧ st = U) {
pid := action get pid(act);
ul add(ul, (tid, pid));
}
lsn, act := log b next(i);
tid := action get tid(act);
tid, , st := tt search(tt, tid);
}
log close b iter(i);
x = (lsn≤,−) ∧ lsn≤ = max(tt↓2) ∧ log tids (lgc ⊗ x) ⊆ tt↓1
∧ ul undo (tt, lgc ⊗ x, ul′) ∧ set (tt, tt) ∗ ulist (ul, ul ⊗ ul′)
log (−⊗ (−, CHK[−])⊗ lgc ⊗ x⊗−) ∗ db state (rl)

i := ul mk iter(ul);
x = (lsn≤,−) ∧ lsn≤ = max(tt↓2) ∧ log tids (lgc ⊗ x) ⊆ tt↓1
∧ ul undo (tt, lgc ⊗ x, ul′) ∧ set (tt, tt) ∗ ulist (ul, ul ⊗ ul′) ∗ uliter (i, ul ⊗ ul′)
log (−⊗ (−, CHK[−])⊗ lgc ⊗ x⊗−) ∗ db state (rl)

lsn, tid, pid := ul next(i);
∃ulr. lg = −⊗ (−, CHK[−])⊗ lgc ⊗ x⊗−
∧ ul ⊗ ul′ = ulp ⊗ ulr ∧ ((lsn 6= nil) ∨ (lsn = nil ∧ ulr = ∅))
∧ log undos (ulp, lg′) ∧ db undos (ulp, rl′) ∧ x = (lsn≤,−)
∧ lsn≤ = max(tt↓2) ∧ log tids (lgc ⊗ x) ⊆ tt↓1 ∧ ul undo (tt, lgc ⊗ x, ul′)
∧ set (tt, tt) ∗ ulist (ul, ul ⊗ ul′) ∗ uliter (i, ulr)
log (lg ⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ rl′)

while (lsn 6= nil) {
lsn′ := log mk lsn();
log append(lsn′, R[tid, pid]);
db update(R[tid, pid]);
lsn, tid, pid := ul next(i);
}
lsn = nil ∧ lg = −⊗ (−, CHK[−])⊗ lgc ⊗ x⊗−
∧ log undos (ul ⊗ ul′, lg′) ∧ db undos (ul ⊗ ul′, rl′) ∧ x = (lsn≤,−)
∧ lsn≤ = max(tt↓2) ∧ log tids (lgc ⊗ x) ⊆ tt↓1
∧ ul undo (tt, lgc ⊗ x, ul′) ∧ set (tt, tt) ∗ ulist (ul, ul ⊗ ul′) ∗ uliter (i,∅)
log (lg ⊗ lg′) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ rl′)

ul close iter(i);
ul free(ul);{
set (tt, tt) ∧ lsn = max(tt↓2) ∧ ul undo (tt, lg ⊗ (lsn, act), ul)
log bseg (lg ⊗ (lsn, act)⊗ lg′) ∧ log undos (ul, lg′) ∗ db state (rl ⊗ ul)
}
Fig. 10. Implementation and proof of the ARIES undo phase.
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Property 1 (Host Failure). For every a ∈ Atom, (v, d) ∈ dom([[a]]) with v 6=  
∃d′ ∈ Durable. (  , d) ∈ [[a]]((v, d))
This property ensures that every atomic command will (potentially) host-fail
if starting in a non-host-failed state. Thus, any program made up of such atomic
commands will non-deterministically experience a host-failure at any point in
time.
Property 2 (Host Failure Propagation). For every a ∈ Atom, d ∈ Durable
[[a]]((
 
, d)) =
{
(
 
, d)
}
This property ensures that once a host-failure occurs, any subsequent atomic
command is forced to remain in a host-failed state.
Parameter 5 (Volatile and Durable Views) The view monoids
(Viewv, ∗v, uv) and (Viewd, ∗d, ud), where  6∈ Viewv. The view monoid (View, ∗, u)
defined as the product of the volatile and durable view monoids.
Definition 2 (View Monoid Encoding). Let (View  ,v, ∗ ,v, uv) be the view
monoid where, View ,v = Viewv ∪
{ }
and for every p, q ∈ View  ,v
p ∗ ,v q =
{ 
if p =
 ∨ q =  
p ∗v q otherwise
The view monoid (View , ∗  , u ) is defined as the product of the view monoids
View ,v and Viewd.
This is passed on to Views as the “views commutative semi-group” parameter
(parameter D). To avoid confusion from this point forwards, we refer to views as
elements of the carrier set of the monoid, and to Views as the Views framework.
Parameter 6 (Volatile and Durable Reification) The volatile view reifica-
tion function b−cv : Viewv → P(Volatile). The durable view reification func-
tion b−cd : Viewd → P(Durable).
Definition 3 (Reification Encoding). The reification function b−c : View →
P(S) is defined by:
b(pv, pd)c=
{
bpvcv × bpdcd if pv 6=  { }× bpdcd otherwise
This is passed on to Views as the “reification” parameter (parameter F).
In order to encode the concept that a command may execute normally or
may experience a host-failure, we require a notion of disjunction for the views of
definition 2. Following is the formal definition as a parameter, and the associated
properties required by Views.
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Parameter 7 (Disjunction) A function
∨
: (I → View)→ View satisfying
the following properties:
– Join Distributivity: p ∗∨i∈I qi = ∨i∈I(p ∗ qi)
– Join Morphism: b∨i∈I pic = ⋃i∈Ibpic
Definition 4 (Disjunction Encoding). The function
∨  : (I → View ) →
View that extends
∨
s.t. for every i ∈ I, j ∈ J with pi =  and pj 6=  ∨
pffault,k∈I∪J
pk =
{ } ∪ ∨
j∈J
pj
By the properties of set union and join distributivity and morphism of
∨
,
∨  
also satisfies join distributivity and morphism.
This is passed on to Views as the “view combination” parameter (parameter N).
We associate axioms with each atomic command.
Parameter 8 (Axiomatisation) The set of axioms Axioms ⊆ Viewd×View×
Atom×View.
Definition 5. Axiomatisation Encoding For every (s, p, a, q) ∈ Axioms, (p, a, q∨
(
 
, s)) ∈ Axioms  .
This is passed on to View as the “axiomatisation” parameter (parameter E).
Definition 6 (Entailment). The entailment relation ⊆ View × View, is
defined by:
p  q def⇐⇒ ∃s. (s, p, id, q) ∈ Axioms
The entailment relation d⊆ Viewd ×Viewd, is defined by:
d  d′ def⇐⇒ ∃s, v, v′. (s, (v, d), id, (v′, d′)) ∈ Axioms
Parameter 9 (Recovery programs) A function recovers : Comm→ Comm
associating programs to recovery programs. The function must be such that:
∀CR ∈ codom(Comm). recovers(CR) = CR. That is, the recovery of a recovery
is the same recovery.
Lemma 1 (Host Failure Propagation Axiom). The following axiom holds
in the program logic of View :
{
(
 
, s)
}
C
{
(
 
, s)
}
Proof. From property 2, for all a ∈ Atom, (( , s), a, ( , s)) ∈ Axioms . The
conclusion follows by induction on C.
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Next we define how judgements of our program logic are encoded into Views
judgements, define the rules of our logic and justify them by using the encoding
and Views proof rules. We distinguish between the rules of our logic and rules of
Views by pre-pending V in the name of a Views proof rule.
Definition 7 (Program Logic). Judgements are of the form: s ` {p} C {q},
where p, q ∈ View, s ∈ Viewd and C ∈ Comm, and are encoded in views as{
p
}
C
{
q ∨ (  , s)}. The proof rules for these judgements and their justification
are as follows:
(s, p, a, q) ∈ Axioms
s ` {p} a {q} Axiom
Proof. From the axiom encoding (def 5) and the axiom rule of the views program
logic.
s ` {p} C {q}
s ∗d rd `
{
p ∗ (rv, rd)
}
C
{
q ∗ (rv, rd)
} Frame
Proof. Assume the premiss holds. The premiss is encoded in views as:{
p
}
C
{
q ∨ (  , s)}
Then, apply the frame rule of the views program logic with frame (rv, rd) (note
rv 6=  ): {
p
}
C
{
q ∨ (  , s)}{
p ∗  (rv, rd)
}
C
{
(q ∨ ( , s)) ∗  (rv, rd)
} VFrame
From the conclusion we have:{
p ∗  (rv, rd)
}
C
{
(q ∨ (  , s)) ∗ (rv, rd)
}
⇐⇒{
p ∗  (rv, rd)
}
C
{
(q ∗  (rv, rd)) ∨ ((  , s) ∗  (rv, rd)
}
⇐⇒{
p ∗ (rv, rd)
}
C
{
(q ∗ (rv, rd)) ∨ ((  ∗  ,v rv, s ∗d rd))
}
⇐⇒{
p ∗  (rv, rd)
}
C
{
(q ∗  (rv, rd)) ∨ ((  , s ∗d rd))
}
⇐⇒{
p ∗ (rv, rd)
}
C
{
(q ∗ (rv, rd)) ∨ ((  , s ∗d rd))
}
⇐⇒
s ∗d rd `
{
p ∗ (rv, rd)
}
C
{
q ∗ (rv, rd)
}
which is the conclusion of our frame rule.
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s ` {p} skip {q}
Proof. From the encoding of s ` {p} skip {q} and application of the views rule
for skip.
s ` {p} C1 {q} s ` {p} C2 {q}
s ` {p} C1 + C2 {q} Choice
Proof. Assume the premisses hold. The premisses are encoded into views as{
p
}
C1
{
q ∨ ( , s)} and {p} C2 {q ∨ (  , s)}
Applying the views rule for C1+C2 we get the conclusion
{
p
}
C1 + C2
{
q ∨ (  , s)}
which is the encoding of the conclusion of our rule.
s ` {p} C {p}
s ` {p} C∗ {p} Iter
Proof. Assume the premiss holds. The premiss is encoded as
{
p
}
C
{
p ∨ (  , s)}.
Then,
p  p ∨ (  , s)
{
p
}
C
{
p ∨ (  , s)} {( , s)} C {(  , s)}{
p ∨ ( , s)} C {p ∨ (  , s)} VDisj{
p ∨ ( , s)} C∗ {p ∨ (  , s)} VIter{
p
}
C∗
{
p ∨ (  , s)} VCons
The final conclusion in the derivation is the encoding of the conclusion of our
rule.
s ` {p} c1 {r} s ` {r} c2 {q}
s ` {p} C1;C2 {q} Seq
Proof. Assume the premisses hold. They are encoded as
{
p
}
C1
{
r ∨ ( , s)} and{
r
}
C2
{
q ∨ (  , s)}. Then,
{
p
}
C1
{
r ∨ ( , s)}
{
r
}
C2
{
q ∨ (  , s)} {( , s)} C2 {(  , s)}{
r ∨ ( , s)} C2 {q ∨ ( , s)} VDisj{
p
}
C1;C2
{
q ∨ ( , s)} VSeq
The final conclusion in the derivation is the encoding of the conclusion of our
rule.
s1 `
{
p1
}
C1
{
q1
}
s2 `
{
p2
}
C2
{
q2
}
q1 = (v1, d1) q2 = (v2, d2)
(s1 ∗d s2) ∨ (s1 ∗d d2) ∨ (s2 ∗d d1) `
{
p1 ∗ p2
}
C1||C2
{
q1 ∗ q2
} Para
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Proof. Assume the premisses hold. The premiss are encoded as:
{
p1
}
C1
{
q1 ∨ (  , s1)
}
and
{
p2
}
C2
{
q2 ∨ (  , s2)
}
. Then,{
p1
}
C1
{
q1 ∨ ( , s1)
}{
p2
}
C2
{
q2 ∨ ( , s2)
}{
p1 ∗ p2
}
C1||C2{
(q1 ∨ ( , s1)) ∗ (q2 ∨ (  , s2))
}
VCons− post
q1 = (v1, d1) q2 = (v2, d2)
{
p1 ∗ p2
}
C1||C2
{
(q1 ∗ q2) ∨ ( , (s1 ∗d s2) ∨ (s1 ∗d d2) ∨ (s2 ∗d d1))
} VPara
The final conclusion in the derivation is the encoding of the conclusion of our
rule.
p  p′ s ` {p′} C {q}
s ` {p} C {q} Cons− pre
q′  q s ` {p} C {q′}
s ` {p} C {q} Cons− post
s′  s s′ ` {p} C {q}
s ` {p} C {q} Cons− fault
Proof. The first rule is justified by the views encoding and applying precondition
strengthening. The second and third rules is justified by the views encoding and
applying postcondition weakening.
∀i ∈ I. s ` {pi} C {q}
s ` {∨ {pi}i∈I} C {q} Disj
Proof. The rule is justified by encoding the premiss and conclusions and the
disjunction rule of views.
s ` {(pv, pd)} C {(qv, qd)}
s ` {(uv, s)} CR {(q′v, r)}
CR recovers C
r ` {(pv, pd)} [C] {(qv, qd)} Recovery − Abstraction
Proof. First we encode [C] as follows:
[C] , C; (norm+ ((pf∅;CR)+;norm; pf  ))
where C+ , C;C∗ and pf∅, norm, pf  are commands (not available to clients)
with the following axiomatic semantics:{
p ∨ (  , s)} norm {p}{
p ∨ ( , s)} pf∅ {(uv, s)}{
(v, d)
}
pf  
{
(
 
, d)
}
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Note that because the commands are not available to the client, as in they are
only used within the encoding into Views, properties 1 and 2 can be ignored.
Assume the premisses hold. The first two premisses are encoded as:{
(pv, qd)
}
C
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}{
(uv, s)
}
CR
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
Then, we have the following derivations:
{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
norm
{
(qv, qd)
}
(qv, qd)  (qv, qd) ∨ (  , r){
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
norm
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
} VCons− post
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
norm
{
(q′v, r)
}
{
(q′v, r)
}
pf 
{
(
 
, r)
}
(
 
, r)  (qv, qd) ∨ ( , r){
(q′v, r)
}
pf {
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
}
VCons− post
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
norm; pf 
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
} VSeq
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
pf∅
{
(uv, s)
} {
(uv, s)
}
CR
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
pf∅;CR
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
} VSeq{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
(pf∅;CR)∗
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
} VIter
{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
pf∅{
(uv, s)
}
{
(uv, s)
}
CR{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
pf∅;CR{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
VSeq {
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
(pf∅;CR)∗{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
(pf∅;CR); (pf∅;CR)∗{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
VSeq
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
(pf∅;CR)+{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
VChoice
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{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
(pf∅;CR)+{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
{
(q′v, r) ∨ (
 
, s)
}
norm; pf  {
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
}{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
(pf∅;Cr)+; (norm; pf  ){
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , r)
}
VSeq
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
norm{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , r)
}
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
(pf∅;CR)+;norm; pf  {
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
}{
(qv, qq) ∨ (  , s)
}
norm+ ((pf∅;CR)+;norm; pf ){
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
}
VChoice
{
(pv, pd)
}
C{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , s)
}
{
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , s)
}
norm+ ((pf∅;CR)+;norm; pf ){
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
}{
(pv, pd)
}
C; (norm+ ((pf∅;CR)+;norm; pf )){
(qv, qd) ∨ ( , r)
}
VSeq
{
(pv, pd)
}
[C]
{
(qv, qd) ∨ (  , r)
} [C]
The final conclusion in the derivation is the encoding of the conclusion of our
rule.
When properties 1 and 2 hold the soundness of our program logic then
depends on the soundness of its encoding in Views. This is established by the
“axiom soundness” property of Views (property G) for the encoded axioms of
definition 5. When all the parameters of the framework are instantiated and the
aforementioned three properties established, then the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). If the judgement s ` {p} C {q} is derivable in the
program logic, then if we run the program C from state reified from view p, then
C will either not terminate, or terminate in state reified from view q, or a host
failure will occur destroying any volatile state and the remaining durable state
(after potential recoveries) will reify from s.
D.1 FTCSL
We now encode FTCSL into the general framework. The encoding is based on
using pairs of volatile and durable views to account for local state and the shared
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resource invariant. Let Volatile be the volatile machine states (parameter 2)
and Durable be the durable machine states (parameter 3). Let (Viewv, ∗v, uv)
and (Viewd, ∗d, ud) be (disjoint concurrent separation logic) volatile and durable
view monoids respectively.
Definition 8 (FTCSL Volatile and Durable Views). The FTCSL volatile
view monoid is:
(Viewv ×Viewv unionmulti {⊥} , ∗cv, ucv)
where ucv = (uv, uv), and
(p, i) ∗cv (q, j) =

(p ∗v q, i) if i = j ∨ j = uv
(p ∗v q, j) if i = uv
⊥ otherwise
Similarly, the FTCSL durable view monoid is:
((Viewd ×Viewd) unionmulti {⊥} , ∗cd, ucd)
where ucd = (ud, ud), and
(p, i) ∗cd (q, j) =

(p ∗d q, i) if i = j ∨ j = ud
(p ∗d q, j) if i = ud
⊥ otherwise
We instantiate parameter 5 using the definition above.
Let b−cv and b−cd be volatile and durable reifications for Viewv and Viewd
respectively.
Definition 9 (FTCSL Volatile and Durable Reification). FTCSL volatile
reification is defined as:
b(p, i)ccv = bp ∗v icv b⊥ccv = ∅
Similarly, FTCSL durable reification is defined as:
b(p, i)ccd = bp ∗d icd b⊥ccd = ∅
We instantiate parameter 6 with the definition above.
Definition 10 (FTCSL Program Logic). Judgements of FTCSL are of the
form: (jv, jd) ; s `
{
(pv, pd)
}
C
{
(qv, qd)
}
. FTCSL judgements are encoded in
the general framework as: (s, jd) `
{
((pv, jv), (pd, jd))
}
C
{
((qv, jv), (qd, jd))
}
.
The rules of FTCSL are given in figure 3 (written using assertions). Sequence,
consequence, frame, parallel and recovery abstraction rules are justified directly by
the respective rules of the general program logic (definition 7) and the judgement
encoding.
The atomic rule, written using views, is:
(uv, ud) ; (pd ∗d jd) ∨ (qd ∗d jd) `
{
(pv ∗v jv, pd ∗d jd)
}
C
{
(qv ∗v jv, qd ∗d jd)
}
(jv, jd) ; pd ∨ qd `
{
(pv, pd)
} 〈C〉 {(qv, qd)}
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Proof. Assume the premiss holds. The premiss is encoded into the general judge-
ment as:
((pd ∗d jd) ∨ (qd ∗d jd), ud) `
{
(((pv ∗v jv), uv), ((pd ∗d jd), ud))
}
C{
(((qv ∗v jv), uv), ((qd ∗d jd), ud))
}
By the reifications of definition 9, it is clear that:
b(pv ∗v jv, iv)ccv = b(pv, iv ∗v jv)ccv
b(pd ∗d jd, id)ccd = b(pd, id ∗d jd)ccd
This means, that by moving views between the resource invariant and the local
state does not change the underlying machine states. We use this to justify the
following axioms:
((pd ∗d jd), id) `
{
(((pv ∗v jv), iv), ((pd ∗d jd), id))
}
id{
((pv, (iv ∗v jv)), (pd, (id ∗d jd)))
}
(pd, (id ∗d jd)) `
{
((pv, (iv ∗v jv)), (pd, (id ∗d jd)))
}
id{
(((pv ∗v jv), iv), ((pd ∗d jd), id))
}
(jd, pd ∨ qd) `
{
(uv, (ud, (pd ∗d jd) ∨ (qd ∗d jd)))
}
id{
(uv, (jd, pd ∨ qd))
}
The axioms justify the following entailments:
((pv, jv), (pd, jd))  (((pv ∗v jv), uv), ((pd ∗d jd), ud))
(((qv ∗v jv), uv), ((qd ∗d jd), ud))  ((qv, jv), (qd, jd))
(ud, (pd ∗d jd) ∨ (qd ∗d jd)) d (pd ∨ qd, jd)
Then, we apply the consequence rules:
(ud, (pd ∗d jd) ∨ (qd ∗d jd)) `
{
(((pv ∗v jv), uv), ((pd ∗d jd), ud))
}
C{
(((qv ∗v jv), uv), ((qd ∗d jd), ud))
}
((pv, jv), (pd, jd))  (((pv ∗v jv), uv), ((pd ∗d jd), ud))
(((qv ∗v jv), uv), ((qd ∗d jd), ud))  ((qv, jv), (qd, jd))
(ud, (pd ∗d jd) ∨ (qd ∗d jd)) d (pd ∨ qd, jd)
(pd ∨ qd, jd) `
{
((pv, jv), (pd, jd))
} 〈C〉 {((qv, jv), (qd, jd))} Cons− pre, post, fault
The conclusion of the above derivation is the encoding of the atomic rule’s
conclusion.
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Next, the share rule, written using views, is:
(jv ∗v rv, jd ∗d rd) ; s `
{
(pv, pd)
}
C
{
(qv, qd)
}
(jv, jd) ; s `
{
(pv ∗v rv, pd ∗d rd)
}
C
{
(qv ∗v rv, qd ∗d rd)
}
Proof. Assume the premiss holds. The premiss is encoded into FTV as:
(s, jd ∗d rd) `
{
((pv, jv ∗v rv), (pd, jd ∗d rd))
}
C
{
((qv, jv ∗v rv), (qd, jd ∗d rd))
}
By the same argument as in the atomic rule, the following entailments hold:
((pv ∗v rv, jv), (pd ∗d rd, jd))  ((pv, jv ∗v rv), (pd, jd ∗d rd))
((qv, jv ∗v rv), (qd, jd ∗d rd))  ((qv ∗v rv, jv), (qd ∗d rd, jd))
(s, jd ∗d rd) d (s ∗d rd, jd)
Then, by application of the consequence rules:
(s, jd ∗d rd) `
{
((pv, jv ∗v rv), (pd, jd ∗d rd))
}
C{
((qv, jv ∗v rv), (qd, jd ∗d rd))
}
((pv ∗v rv, jv), (pd ∗d rd, jd))  ((pv, jv ∗v rv), (pd, jd ∗d rd))
((qv, jv ∗v rv), (qd, jd ∗d rd))  ((qv ∗v rv, jv), (qd ∗d rd, jd))
(s, jd ∗d rd) d (s ∗d rd, jd)
(s ∗d rd, jd) `
{
((pv ∗v rv, jv), (pd ∗d rd, jd))
}
C{
((qv ∗v rv, jv), (qd ∗d rd, jd))
}
Cons− pre, post
The conclusion of the above derivation is the encoding of the atomic rule’s
conclusion.
Given the parameters to the general framework described here, including
disjunction (parameter 7) and recovery programs 9, and with the required
properties established, we justify soundness of FTCSL by the soundness of the
general framework.
Theorem 3 (FTCSL Soundness). If the judgement
(jv, jd) ; s `
{
(pv, pd)
}
C
{
(qv, qd)
}
is derivable in the program logic, then if we run the program C from an initial
state that is reified from view (pv ∗v jv, pd ∗d jd), then C will either not terminate,
or it will terminate in a state reified from view (qv ∗v jv, qd ∗d jd), or a host
failure will occur destroying any volatile state and remaining durable state (after
potential recoveries) will reify from s ∗d jd. The view (jv, jd) is preserved by every
step of C.
